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Although unintentionality is one of the
key elements common to most traditional
definitions of automaticity (e.g., Posner
and Snyder, 1975; Shiffrin and Schneider,
1977; Hasher and Zacks, 1979; Jacoby
et al., 1993; Tzelgov, 1997; Moors and De
Houwer, 2006), more recent approaches
pointed out that many automatic pro-
cesses are affected and even elicited by
intended processes (e.g., Bargh, 1994;
Hommel, 2000; Tzelgov and Ganor-Stern,
2005; Yamaguchi and Proctor, 2012).
However, there was no attempt to provide
a systematic analysis of the different ways
in which intended processes activate auto-
matic ones. The present paper aims to fill
this gap.
We view automatic processes as a prod-
uct of interplay between information in
long-term memory, reflecting life-long
experience, and information in working
memory, reflecting the requirement of the
current situation. Such requirements are
translated into task sets (Monsell et al.,
2001), which activate the intended pro-
cesses directly but may also activate some
unintended processes indirectly. This acti-
vation of an unintended process (AUP) is
a product of the overlap existing between
the parameters of the intended process
and those of unintended processes that are
often highly practiced (Kornblum et al.,
1990; Hommel, 2000).
Automatic processes can be triggered by
AUP, and in some cases they will not start
without it. Automatic processes differ in
their dependence on AUP. Some automatic
processes need very little AUP to occur,
while for others, stronger AUP is needed
(e.g., Bargh, 1989, 1992). Furthermore,
AUP may not only trigger the occur-
rence of a process, but may also enhance
its behavioral manifestation. For exam-
ple, when the interference paradigm is
used, the behavioral manifestation of the
automatic processing, which is the inter-
ference effect, will be larger in conditions
of strong vs. weak AUP.
We expand on the original taxon-
omy of dimensional overlap developed
by Kornblum et al. (1990) and propose
a classification of five levels of AUP, by
which automatic processes are activated by
intended ones. Furthermore, we demon-
strate their effects using empirical findings
of well-known indicators of automaticity.
Note that a single task can provide AUP at
multiple levels.
AUP AT THE STIMULUS-LOCATION
LEVEL
The experimental task directs participants’
attention to an area in space or to an
object (e.g., Bundesen, 1990; Scholl, 2001).
Strong AUP at the stimulus-location level
occurs when the task directs the par-
ticipant’s attention to the place where
the automatically processed information
is located. Consequentially, it encourages
the processing of all dimensions of this
object (e.g., Kahneman and Treisman,
1984; Kramer and Jacobson, 1991; Pratt
and Hommel, 2003).
Findings with the Stroop task demon-
strate AUP at this level. In this task,
naming the color of the ink in which a
color word is printed is hampered when
the color word and the ink color are incon-
gruent vs. congruent, indicating the auto-
maticity of word reading (Stroop, 1935).
Separating the word from the task-relevant
colored stimulus presumably reduces the
AUP, and thus results in a reduced Stroop
effect relative to a situation where they
are presented as an integrated object (e.g.,
Kahneman and Henik, 1981; MacLeod,
1998; Lamers and Roelofs, 2007).
Additionally, spreading visual attention
too widely by presenting another word
in the display reduces the Stroop effect,
an effect referred to as the dilution effect
(Kahneman and Chajczyk, 1983). On the
other hand, narrowing visual attention to
the letter level by coloring only a single
letter in a color word causes a reduction in
the Stroop effect (Besner et al., 1997).
AUP AT THE STIMULUS-IDENTITY
LEVEL
The experimental task directs the par-
ticipant’s attention to a specific stimulus,
which may be associated with one or more
processes. Strong AUP at the stimulus-
identity level exists when the task directs
the participant’s attention to a stimulus
that is strongly associated with a particular
highly practiced (yet, currently irrelevant)
process. In such cases, attending to that
stimulus might activate this process.
There is an especially strong associa-
tion between words and the highly prac-
ticed skill of reading (Besner et al., 1997).
As a consequence, attending to a word
might activate the reading process and
this should impair performance when the
required task is not reading. Moreover, the
activation of the reading process should
increase with the resemblance of the stim-
ulus to a word. Indeed, Monsell et al.
(2001) showed that the slowing in a color
naming task was dependent on the extent
to which the non-words resembled words.
Color naming was slower when the carrier
stimulus resembled a word than when it
did not. The difference between AUP at the
stimulus location and at the stimulus iden-
tity level is similar to that between “where”
and “what” in visual attention.
AUP AT THE PROCESS LEVEL
The experimental task indicates the nature
of the process required. There are two
types of AUP at the process level. First, the
intention to perform a process might acti-
vate related processes. Second, the process
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required by a task might still be active even
when it is no longer needed.
AUP FROM THE PROCESS REQUIRED BY THE
CURRENT TASK
Experimental tasks require a wide vari-
ety of processes, such as naming, detec-
tion, classification, and comparison. The
stronger the similarity or the association
between the intended process and unin-
tended ones is, the stronger the AUP. In
this case, the process required by the task
might activate related processes, perhaps
through spreading activation.
Evidence for this type of AUP is pro-
vided, for example, by La Heij et al. (1998).
Using the picture-word interference task,
they found the gender congruency effect
(difference in performance between tri-
als in which the gender of the verbal
title of the depicted object was congru-
ent vs. incongruent with the gender of the
word) only when participants produced
noun phrases and not when they pro-
duced nouns only. Presumably the former
activates gender-marking information to a
greater extent than the latter does. Similar
results were found in studies that looked
at the effect of the grammatical category
of the distractor word on performance
in the same task (Pechmann and Zerbst,
2002; Pechmann et al., 2004). Analogous
findings were reported by Vigliocco et al.
(2005). Together, these studies suggest that
the automatic activation of grammati-
cal characteristics of an irrelevant stimu-
lus during speech production depends on
pre-activation of the specific grammatical
information from the required task.
AUP FROM THE PROCESS REQUIRED BY THE
PREVIOUS TASK
This type of AUP is strong when the unin-
tended automatic process was required by
the previous task. The processes required
in a previous task, although not rele-
vant anymore, might still be activated and
influence the performance in the current
task. The consistent pattern of poorer per-
formance on task-switch trials (i.e., trials
following a shift from one task to another)
compared to task repetition trials is an
example for such an effect (e.g., Kiesel
et al., 2010; Meiran, 2010; Vandierendonck
et al., 2010). It is partly due to carryover
of activation from the previous task (e.g.,
Allport et al., 1994; Yeung et al., 2006).
AUP AT THE STIMULUS-DIMENSION
LEVEL
The experimental task often requires
a classification according to a certain
dimension—size, color, polarity, etc. This
might encourage the application of the
same classification also to irrelevant stim-
uli. Strong AUP occurs when the dimen-
sion of interest is also applicable to other
aspects or objects that are task-irrelevant
(Kornblum et al., 1990; Kornblum and
Lee, 1995).
Empirical evidence for this kind of AUP
comes, for example, from the size congru-
ency effect, which is found when a clas-
sification of digits according to physical
size is required. Performance is enhanced
when the numerical and physical sizes
correspond, compared to when they do
not, indicating the automatic processing
of numerical magnitude (e.g., Henik and
Tzelgov, 1982). In this case, the process-
ing of the physical size required by the task
might trigger the automatic processing
of the irrelevant numerical size. Indeed,
studies that used a luminance judgment
found either no evidence for automatic
numerical processing (Pinel et al., 2004)
or a reduced effect (Rubinsten and Henik,
2005; Cohen Kadosh and Henik, 2006).
In a similar manner, the Stroop effect
varies as a function of the overlap at the
stimulus-dimension level between the rel-
evant ink-color and irrelevant word. It is
largest for color words, decreases for color-
associated words, and decreases even more
for words unrelated to color (Klein, 1964;
MacLeod, 1991; Sharma and McKenna,
1998; Risko et al., 2006).
The effect of AUP at the stimulus-
dimension level is also found for invol-
untary attention shifts. Folk et al. (1992)
showed that the occurrence of involun-
tary shifts of attention depended on task
demands and specifically, on the relation
between the properties of the cue and the
properties required to locate the target.
They were present when the cue shared
a feature property that was critical to the
performance of the target task; for exam-
ple, when the target was defined by color,
colored cues produced involuntary atten-
tion shifts. Note that this AUP level dif-
fers from the previous one because AUP
at the stimulus dimension refers to the
stimulus dimension that is task-relevant,
while AUP at the process level refers to
the mental operation that is employed.
Different processes might be applied to the
same dimensions.
AUP AT THE RESPONSE LEVEL
The task set specifies the response cat-
egories and the way they are mapped
onto the actual responses. Strong AUP
occurs when the processing of the irrel-
evant dimension can be mapped onto
the same set of responses specified for
the relevant dimension. Such overlap may
enhance the indications for automaticity.
Indeed, larger Stroop effects are found for
words that are part of the set of possi-
ble responses than for words that are not
(Klein, 1964; MacLeod, 1991; Sharma and
McKenna, 1998).
The present work could be viewed as
an extension of Kornblum’s dimensional
overlap theory (Kornblum et al., 1990;
Kornblum and Lee, 1995), which focused
on stimulus-stimulus and stimulus-
response overlap. We added to this
framework the AUP at the stimulus
location, stimulus identity, and process
levels. Moreover, we related the system-
atic analysis of levels of AUP to degrees
of automaticity. Automatic processes dif-
fer in the extent to which they depend
on activation from the intended task,
consistent with a gradual approach to
automaticity (e.g., Moors and De Houwer,
2006). Some automatic processes need
very little AUP to occur, with the least
amount of AUP provided at the levels of
stimulus location and stimulus identity.
In fact, AUP at the stimulus level might
be present even when there is no task
at hand. In such cases, automatic pro-
cessing will occur whenever the relevant
stimulus is attended. In other cases, addi-
tional preconditions need to be met (e.g.,
Bargh, 1989, 1992). Such preconditions
are provided by the other levels of AUP.
The automatic process might occur only
when the intended task involves a related
process, a similar stimulus-dimension or
the same response set.
SUMMARY
Although past works on automaticity
acknowledged the fact that automatic pro-
cesses are affected and even elicited by
intended ones, there was no attempt to
analyze this influence in detail. The present
paper proposed a systematic analysis of
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the ways the intended process activates
or elicits the occurrence of the automatic
one. Examples for the effects of the AUP
levels on automatic processes in differ-
ent domains demonstrate the generality of
this analysis. Results from other paradigms
such as the flanker and Simon tasks could
nicely fit into this analysis, however they
were omitted from this paper, due to space
limitations. Note that the different AUP
levels are not mutually exclusive and a cer-
tain task might produce multiple levels
of AUP to the automatic process. This is
the case of the color-word Stroop effect,
where all levels of AUP operate, and this
may account for the robustness of the
effect.
AUP affects not only the presence
of the automatic process but also its
behavioral indicators. As described in
this paper, numerous studies from differ-
ent domains showed that stronger AUP
produced larger and stronger behavioral
indicators of automaticity compared to
weak AUP.
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